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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through DIVISION 
OF FORESTRY, FIRE & STATE LANDS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH; SIX MILE 
RANCH COMPANY, a Utah corporation; 
CRAIG S. BLEAZARD, an individual; 
MARK C. BLEAZARD, an individual; and 
JOHN C. BLEAZARD, an individual. 
Defendants/Appellees. 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment (R. 345-48; Addendum A) in favor of 
defendants that was entered in the Third Judicial District Court on May 8,2000. The 
State of Utah filed a timely notice of appeal on June 6, 2000. Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-2-2(j) and 78-2a-3(2) (1996), the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the 
appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did former Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 (Supp. 1993) (Addendum B) require 
Tooele County to give written notice of the Petition to Vacate the West Stansbury Road to 
Appeal No. 20000493-SC 
Priority No. 15 (Subject to 
Assignment to Court of Appeals) 
1 
abutting landowners, in addition to notice by publication? 
2. If so, did the statute require written notice to the State of Utah, an owner of 
record of public lands abutting the part of West Stansbury Road to be vacated, even 
though the State does not pay property taxes? 
Preservation: These issues were preserved in the Appellant's Memoranda (R. 96-
106, 125-27, 320-24), Tooele County's Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment (R. 
117), the other Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 287-91, 284-85), at oral argument on the motion (R. 355 ), in the trial 
court's bench ruling (R. 355 at 42-45; Addendum C), and in its order granting summary 
judgment (R. 345-48). 
Standards of Review: Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Surety Underwriters v. E &C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, f 15; State ex rel Utah Air 
Quality Board v. Truman Mortensen Family Trust, 2000 UT 67, f 16; Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). On appeal of a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court determines if the 
trial court erred in applying the governing law. Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 
P.2d 1060,1063 (Utah 1996). Interpretations of a statute present questions of law 
reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the trial court. Lieber v. ITT Hartford 
Insurance Center, Inc., 2000 UT 72, f7; Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 
518, 519 (Utah 1997). Moreover, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment an appellate 
2 
court views the facts and the reasonable factual inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, here, the State of Utah. See Surety Underwriters 
v. E &C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, f 15; Glover ex rel Dyson v. Boy Scouts of 
America, 923 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The full text of relevant statutes is included in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/ STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves the State's challenge to a Tooele County ordinance purporting 
to vacate the north end of a public road, called here the West Stansbury Road. This road 
provided the general public and the State's employees and lessees access to State 
sovereign lands on and around Stansbury and Badger Islands in the Great Salt Lake. (R. 
7-11). These sovereign lands were acquired by the State of Utah at statehood in 1896 
from the United States. They comprise lake bed that is always underwater as well as all 
land below the peripatetic lake's surveyed meander line, land that is submerged in some 
years and exposed in others. See Utah v. United States, 420 U.S. 304, 305 (1975); Utah 
v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 13 (1971); see also State v. Rolio, 262 P. 987, 994 (Utah 
1927) (taking judicial notice of fact that, on Utah's admission to the Union, fee title to all 
'During 150 years of measurements, the lake's elevation above sea level has 
oscillated 21 feet. William Lee Stokes, The Great Salt Lake 22-23 (1984). The surveyed 
meander line is shown in black and the sovereign lands are shown in grey and light blue 
in Figure 1, a portion of the map used in the trial court and included here as Addendum D. 
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lands underlying navigable waters vested in the State in its sovereign capacity). 
Sovereign lands are public lands held in trust for the people of Utah, see Utah 
Const, art. XX, and managed by the Division, Utah Code Ann. § 65A-10-1 (1996). The 
Division's statutory powers and duties for managing the Great Salt Lake include carrying 
out a comprehensive plan for the lake that recognizes policies to 
(a) develop strategies to deal with a fluctuating lake level; 
(b) encourage development of the lake in a manner which will preserve the 
lake, encourage availability of brines to lake extraction industries, protect 
wildlife, and protect recreational facilities; 
(c) maintain the lake's flood plain as a hazard zone; 
(d) promote water quality management for the lake and its tributary streams; 
(e) promote the development of lake brines, minerals, chemicals, and petro-
chemicals to aid the state's economy; 
(f) encourage the use of appropriate chemicals for extractions of brine, 
minerals, chemicals, and petro-chemicals; 
(g) maintain the lake and the marshes as important to the waterfowl flyway 
system; 
(h) encourage the development of an integrated industrial complex; 
(i) promote and maintain recreation areas on and surrounding the lake; 
(j) encourage safe boating use of the lake; 
(k) maintain and protect state, federal, and private marshlands, rookeries, 
and wildlife refuges; 
(1) provide public access to the lake for recreation, hunting, and fishing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 65A-10-8 (1996). The public's right of access to all state lands for 
hunting, trapping and fishing-including lands below the Great Salt Lake's meander 
line-is statutorily guaranteed. Utah Code Ann. § 23-21-4(1) (Supp. 2000). 
Defendants, the Bleazards and Six Mile Ranch Co., own the private lands that 
West Stansbury Road traverses, in a roughly north-south direction, along the western side 
of Stansbury Island. These private lands are shown in white on Figure 1 (next page) and 
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Addendum D, and the road is shown as a red line, indicated on Figure 1 with an orange 
arrow. In the far north, the West Stansbury Road ends at a dike over state sovereign 
lands, operated by the State's lessee there, MagCorp, that provides vehicle access to 
Badger Island (R. 8-11; R. 355 at 26-27). The road had been designated a Class B road, 
i.e., a county road, and maintained as a public road by Tooele County since at least the 
early 1960s; it was shown as a county road on Tooele County Road Maps in 1991 and 
1993. (R. 177, 299-300). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-103 (Supp. 2000) (formerly Utah 
Code Ann. § 27-12-22). Under former section 27-12-90, all public highways continued 
to be such until abandoned or vacated by the governmental entity with authority to do so. 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-90 (1996) (renumbered 1998; now see Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-
105 (Supp. 2000)). 
Pursuant to former Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.1 (Supp. 1993),2 the defendant 
abutting landowners petitioned Tooele County in early 1993 to vacate that portion of the 
West Stansbury Road from where it enters the south end of defendants' private land to the 
road's terminus at the north end of defendants' private land. (R. 192-96). See Figure 1. 
The statute permitted the county to vacate a county road by ordinance if satisfied, after 
notice and hearing, that there was "good cause" and that it would not be "detrimental to 
2Now see Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-108 (Supp. 2000). The full text of these statutes 
is included in Addendum B. 
5 
the general interest." Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.1 (Supp. 1993).3 
Unless all owners of property abutting the road to be vacated gave written consent 
to the county, Utah law stated that notice "shall in all cases be given as provided in 
Section 27-12-102.4." Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.3 (Supp. 1993). The referenced 
section provided: 
No county road shall be so vacated, unless notice of the pendency of 
the petition and prayer thereof, and the date of the hearing thereon, if such 
petition is filed, or of the intention of the county legislative body of the 
county to vacate, and the date of the hearing on such question if no petition 
is filed, be given by publishing in a newspaper published or of general 
circulation in such county once a week for four consecutive weeks 
preceding action on such petition or intention, or, where no newspaper is 
published in the county by posting the notice in three public places therein 
for four consecutive weeks preceding such petition, and by mailing such 
notice to all owners of record of land abutting the county road proposed to 
be vacated addressed to the mailing address appearing on the rolls of the 
county assessor of the county wherein said land is located 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 (Supp. 1993) (now see Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-108(2) 
(Supp. 2000)). 
Notice of the defendants' petition to vacate the northern portion of West Stansbury 
Road was published in the Tooele Transcript-Bulletin once each week for four 
consecutive weeks ending June 8,1993. (R. 94,107). Notice of the petition and hearing 
was not mailed to the State or other record owners of land abutting the portion of the 
3Even after a public road is properly vacated under the statutes, an abutting 
landowner retains a private easement of access along the vacated portion in order to reach 
her property. See Mason v. State, 656 P.2d 465,468 (Utah 1982); Adney v. State Road 
Common, 248 P. 811, 812 (Utah 1926). 
6 
West Stansbury Road defendants wanted vacated. (R. 88-93, 107; R. 355 at 15, 18). 
Tooele County held a public hearing on the petition on June 13, 1993 at which the State 
was not present. (R. 107, 112; see also R. 355 at 18). 
The Tooele County Board of Commissioners, by a 2-1 vote, later adopted 
Ordinance 93-9 vacating the northern portion of the West Stansbury Road after 
summarily concluding there was good cause to do so and that it would not be detrimental 
to the public interest. (R. 82-83; Addendum E). The defendant private landowners then 
erected a locked gate across the southern end of the vacated portion of West Stansbury 
Road, blocking public access to the sovereign lands on and around Stansbury and Badger 
Islands. (R. 7-8). 
The State of Utah's Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands brought this suit 
seeking to invalidate Ordinance 93-9 because of the failure of the County to comply with 
section 27-12-102.4 by giving the State, as a record owner of sovereign lands abutting the 
portion of West Stansbury Road to be vacated, written notice of the petition to vacate and 
the public hearing thereon. (R. 13). The State alleged that: the road was used for 
decades by the Utah public for recreational access to the Great Salt Lake and to sovereign 
lands on Stansbury and Badger Islands, as well as for access by search-and-rescue and 
law enforcement personnel; it was also used for access by the State's commercial lessees 
and permittees of sovereign lands there, such as brine shrimp harvesters and mineral 
extractors; and, alternatively, that defendant landowners had acquired their property in 
7 
patents from the State that expressly subjected the private lands to the then pre-existing 
public roadway. (R. 10-11; see also R. 90-91, Affidavit in Support of State's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R. 355 at 20). 
The State eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming Ordinance 
93-9 is void because the county did not give the State, an abutting owner, written notice 
of the petition to vacate and the hearing on it.4 (R. 79-80). The defendant Tooele County 
opposed the motion, disputing that the State is an owner of record of land on Stansbury 
island abutting the vacated portion of West Stansbury and asserting that the State's 
mailing address for any such land does not appear on the rolls of the Tooele County 
assessor. (R. 112-18). Defendants Bleazard and Six Mile Ranch also opposed the 
State's motion, arguing that the State is not an abutting landowner. (R. 280-83, 292, 294, 
333, 338; R. 355 at 26-27). 
In addition, these defendants filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 169-
70) on the statutory noncompliance claim, contending first that section 27-12-102.4 does 
not require written notice to abutting landowners if notice is published, as it was here (R. 
287-92, 337; R. 355 at 30-31). Second, defendants argued, even if section 27-12-102.4 
required written notice in addition to publication, the State was not among those abutting 
landowners on Stansbury Island entitled to written notice under the statute because it is 
4This appeal does not involve other bases for summary judgment asserted by, but 
decided adversely to, the State. 
8 
not a private, and thus a tax-paying, landowner whose address is listed on the rolls of the 
Tooele County Assessor (R. 284, 337; R. 355 at 20-22, 32-33). Defendant Tooele County 
concurred in these arguments at the April 12, 2000 hearing on the competing motions. (R. 
355 at 18-20). 
The trial court ruled that there was a dispute about whether the State was an 
abutting landowner. (R. 355 at 42). This material factual dispute precluded summary 
judgment for the State on its statutory noncompliance claim. See Bill Brown Realty, Inc. 
v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1977). 
For purposes of deciding the defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 
however, the trial court assumed the State of Utah was an abutting landowner under 
former section 27-12-102.4. Agreeing with defendants, District Judge David S. Young 
first concluded that the statute did not require written notice to abutting landowners since 
notice by publication had been made. In any event, Judge Young concluded next, even if 
the statute additionally required written notice to abutting landowners, the State was not 
an abutting landowner who paid taxes and thus was appeared on the rolls of the Tooele 
County Assessor, as the statute required. Therefore, the county had complied with 
section 27-12-102.4, and Ordinance 93-9 was not invalid. (R. 347; R. 355 at 42; 
Addendum A). Summary judgment was granted to defendants (R. 345-48), and this 
appeal by the State of Utah ensued (R. 352-53). 
9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the request of some private landowners, Tooele County passed an ordinance 
vacating the northern end of a public road on Stansbury Island that had provided public 
access to Utah sovereign lands there. The county had not mailed to all record owners of 
land abutting the vacated end of the road, including the State of Utah, notice of the 
proposed action or of the public hearing ostensibly held to consider whether it would be 
detrimental to the public interest. 
The trial court concluded the county had complied with the mandate in former 
section 27-12-102.4 for giving prior notice by merely publishing notice of the proposal in 
the Tooele Transcript-Bulletin. Alternatively, the court concluded the statute required 
mailed notice only to owners of record of abutting land who are taxpayers. Both 
interpretations of the statute are erroneous. 
The plain language of section 27-12-102.4, the same as that in current section 10-
8-8.4, requires that notice of a proposal to vacate a public road be mailed to abutting 
landowners, whether public notice is otherwise made by publication or by posting. This 
is consistent with the statute's purpose, with current law, with sound public policy, and 
with Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 437 P.2d 442,448 (Utah 1968). In Tolman, this Court 
held that only posting notice of a proposed government action affecting property rights of 
nearby landowners was constitutionally inadequate. 
In addition, there is no basis for concluding the legislature intended notice of the 
10 
proposal to be mailed just to abutting property owners who also pay property taxes. This 
construction thwarts the statute's purpose-to give prior notice of the possible 
governmental action to all owners of record of land abutting the public road and afford 
them an opportunity to be heard before the road is closed to public travel. Because many 
private and governmental entities besides the State of Utah are likewise exempted from 
paying property taxes, the trial court's construction also leads to results that are absurd 
and constitutionally suspect under Tolman. 
Correctly interpreted, former section 27-12-102.4 required the county to mail 
notice to all abutting landowners, tax exempt or not, in addition to either publishing or 
posting notice of the proposal to vacate the north end of the West Stansbury Road. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the summary judgment granted defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER NOTICE WAS ALSO PUBLISHED OR POSTED, 
SECTION 27-12-102.4 REQUIRED THE COUNTY TO MAIL 
WRITTEN NOTICE TO ABUTTING LANDOWNERS OF THE 
PETITION TO VACATE THE PUBLIC ROAD AND OF THE 
HEARING ON THE PETITION 
A. The plain language of section 27-12-102.4. as punctuated, requires mailed notice 
to abutting landowners in addition to notice bv publication. 
As this Court has held, strict compliance with the notice procedures in section 27-
12-102.4 is required before a public road can be properly vacated by a county. 
Henderson v. Osguthorpe, 657 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 1982); Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 
P.2d 595, 597 (Utah 1974). 
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The first issue in this appeal is whether section 27-12-102.4 required Tooele 
County to mail notice of the petition and public hearing to abutting landowners even 
though it published such notice in the Tooele Transcript-Bulletin. The relevant part of 
this statutory section, with emphasis added, required the County to give notice 
by publishing in a newspaper published or of general circulation in such 
county once a week for four consecutive weeks preceding action on such 
petition or intention, or, where no newspaper is published in the county by 
posting the notice in three public places therein for four consecutive weeks 
preceding such petition, and by mailing such notice to all owners of record 
of land abutting the county road proposed to be vacated addressed to the 
mailing addresses appearing on the rolls of the county assessor of the 
county wherein said land is located 
The controversy involves the meaning of "by publishing . . . , o r , . . . by posting . . . , and 
by mailing " Defendants contended, and Judge Young agreed, that this language 
requires notice be given (a) by publishing or (b) by posting and mailing to abutting 
landowners. Because the notice in this case was properly published, they reasoned, no 
notice had to be mailed to landowners abutting the West Stansbury Road. (R. 280-83; 
292, 294, 333, 338; R. 355 at 26-27) This interpretation of the statute is erroneous. 
In construing a statute, a court looks first to its plain language. State v. Redd, 1999 
UT 108, f 11; Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997). The 
primary goal of the interpreting court is to give effect to the legislative intent, evidenced 
by its plain language viewed in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. 
State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, H 25,4 P.3d 795, 799-800; see Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 
905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). In addition to the duty to effectuate legislative intent, 
12 
reviewing courts have the obligation, whenever possible, to construe statutes to avoid 
constitutional infirmities. In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, f 23, lP.3d 1073; In 
re L.G. W.,64\ P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1982). Moreover, a court must interpret a statute in a 
manner 
that reflects sound public policy, as we presume that must be what the 
legislature intended. See Schurz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 
1108, 1113 (Utah 1991). In other words, we interpret a statute to avoid 
absurd consequences. See Clover v Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 
1045 n.39 (Utah 1991); see also Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 
1292 n.24 (Utah 1993). 
Redd, 1999 UT 108, f 12. 
In addition, far from being a "hypertechnical" consideration, as defendants argued 
below (R. 288), the punctuation of section 27-12-102.4 informs the interpretive process 
and may be resorted to as an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent. See Board ofEduc. 
v. Hanchett, 167 P. 686, 687 (Utah 1917). In such a case, "courts may not, and do not, 
arbitrarily ignore punctuation, but will give it due consideration and effect." Id. 
Here, the statute's punctuation ("by publishing . . . , o r , . . . by posting . . . , and by 
mailing . . . . " ) supports an interpretation of section 27-12-102.4 that requires notice be 
mailed to abutting landowners, whether the general public is notified via publication or 
posting. To indicate this, the drafters used a comma to separate the mailing requirement 
from the publishing or posting requirement instead of using punctuation (or its absence) 
to link mailing only with posting. Cf Kimball Condos. Owners Ass 'n v. County Bd. 
Equal., 943 P.2d 642, 646 (Utah 1997) (concluding legislature, using punctuation 
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advisedly, inserted commas to set one clause apart from the remainder of the statutory 
provision). The drafters' use of a comma before the last clause (", and by mailing...") in 
section 27-12-102.4 suggests that the mailing requirement applies to the previous two 
situations in the series, i.e., publication and posting. If they had intended mailing to be 
linked only with posting, they could have foregone the comma just before "and by 
mailing." Cf Elliot Coal Mining v. Director, Office of Workers Comp., 17 F.3d 616, 630 
(3rd Cir. 1994). 
Section 27-12-102.4, enacted in 1963, was patterned after Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-
8.4 (1999), a 1955 enactment-still in effect- that specifies the manner in which notice 
must be given when a city is considering a proposal to vacate a city street or alley. It, too, 
requires notice of the petition and hearing 
be given by publishing in a newspaper... , or , . . . by posting. . . , and by 
mailing such notice to all owners of record of land abutting the street or 
alley proposed to be vacated addressed to the mailing addresses appearing 
on the rolls of the county assessor of the county wherein such land is 
located.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8.4 (1999) (emphasis added). In Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 
35, 38 (Utah App. 1994), the court interpreted this language-the same as that in former 
section 27-12-102.4-as requiring publication and mailed notice to the abutting 
landowners. Because the city did not comply with this requirement, the purported 
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vacation of a roadway was declared a nullity. Id.5 
Here, a fair reading of section 27-12-102.4 in light of its purpose is likewise that 
the legislature intended notice of a proposal to vacate a public road be given (a) by 
publication or by posting and, in either case, (b) by mailing notice to abutting 
landowners. This interpretation is consistent with the statute's purpose. Notice of the 
petition and hearing is important so that interested parties can attend and present the 
county commissioners with some informed basis for deciding whether there is "good 
cause" to vacate the public road and whether doing so would be "detrimental to the 
general interest" under Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.1 (Supp. 1993). The legislature 
could not have thought that the input necessary under section 27-12-102.1 would reach 
the county commissioners if the only notice given was notice to the general public in a 
local newspaper. Abutting landowners are the persons most likely to know about the 
need for the public road and to care the most about whether the road to their property 
remains a county road, traveled freely by the general public and maintained by the county. 
It is illogical to conclude that the legislature intended known abutting landowners 
to get individual mailed notices of the petition and hearing only in conjunction with 
posting, and not with publication. Neither posting nor publication alone is likely to give 
5This result is consistent with Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 437 P.2d 442 (Utah 
1968), in which this Court held that the county violated due process by only posting 
public notices of a proposed zoning variance that affected the property rights of 
neighboring landowners. Tolman is discussed, infra, at 17. 
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actual notice to individual abutting landowners of a pending proposal to close a public 
road, as is mailed notice. Indeed, the legislature's recognition of the primacy of notice to 
abutting landowners over notice to the general public is reflected in nearby section 27-12-
102.3, which does away with notice to the general public entirely if all the abutting 
owners give written consent to vacating of the public road. 
It is contrary to the statute's purpose to interpret section 27-12-102.4 as not 
requiring mailed notice of a petition to vacate to those most interested in the proposed 
action to be taken by the county. Under this interpretation, urged by defendants and 
adopted by the trial court, a county could vacate a public road by merely publishing notice 
and never mailing individual notice to the abutting landowners who actually live on and 
use the public road. The statute should not be interpreted in a manner that attributes such 
an untenable intent to the legislature and leads to such an absurd result. 
More importantly, interpreting the statute to allow publication of notice, without 
accompanying written notice to abutting landowners, would render the statute vulnerable 
to constitutional challenge. To the extent abutting landowners have property interests 
affected by a proposal to vacate a public road, due process entitles them to adequate 
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Dairy Product Servs. v. City of 
Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, % 48; Anderson v. Utah County Bd. ofCommr's, 589 P.2d 1214, 
1216 (Utah 1979). 
Adequate notice is "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
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apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections." Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 437 P.2d 442, 448 (Utah 1968) 
(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)); 
accord Provo River Water Users' Ass 'n v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 934 (Utah 1993). In 
Tolman, this Court held constitutionally and statutorily invalid notice of a proposed 
zoning variance hearing that was required by the relevant statute only to be published in a 
newspaper and posted in three public places. 437 P.2d at 447-48. This was so because 
the notice given did not reasonably apprise neighboring landowners of the proposed 
zoning change, as due process requires. Id. 
Here, construing section 27-12-102.4 to permit the county to vacate West 
Stansbury Road after only notice by publication would result in a similar constitutional 
infirmity. By itself, publication in the Tooele Transcript-Bulletin would not be 
reasonably calculated to inform abutting landowners of the proposal to vacate the public 
road and of the hearing thereon. To avoid this, the plain language of the statute should 
instead be interpreted as requiring mailed notice to abutting landowners in addition to 
notice by publication. 
B. Even if the meaning of Section 27-12-102.4 is ambiguous about whether mailed 
notice to abutting landowners must accompany notice by publication, legislative 
history supports the view that it must. 
Defendants alternatively argued below that it is not clear from section 27-12-102.4 
whether mailed notice must be given in conjunction with published notice. Accordingly, 
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they directed the trial court to "legislative history" as an interpretive aid. See Vigos v. 
Mountainland Builders.Jnc, 2000 UT 2, % 13, 993 P.2d 207 (concluding a court may 
look beyond its plain language to legislative history if the meaning of a statute is 
ambiguous); World Peace Mvmt v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 257-58 
(Utah 1996) (same). 
For this purpose, defendants relied solely on the 1998 recodification of the statutes 
related to counties' vacating of public roads. (R. 290-92). That year, the legislature 
passed 1998 Utah Laws, ch. 270, § 77, which restructured and moved the bulk of former 
section 27-12-102.4 into new section 72-3-108, effective March 21,1998. The new 
section required that notice be 
(a) published in a newspaper...; or 
(b) posted... and . . . mailed to all owners of property abutting the county 
road. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-108(2) (Supp. 1999) (amended 2000). See Addendum B. 
The parties agreed below that the legislative history of the 1998 rewrite and 
recodification showed it was not intended to make substantive changes in the law 
governing the vacation of public roads. (R. 100-01,291). The sponsor of the 
Transportation Code Recodification Bill reassured other representatives during the House 
floor debate, "There is nothing substantive of any kind new in this. It is a recodification . 
. . . That's why you're seeing the underline, because verbiage has actually been reworded 
to consolidate what in fact is already in existing law. " Remarks of Rep. Marda Dillree, 
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Gen'l Session, 52nd Utah Leg., Jan. 22, 1998, tape 1, counter nos. 1575, 1630. 
Because the 1998 version of section 72-3-108 did apparently require the county to 
provide mailed notice to abutting landowners only along with posting, and not along with 
publication, defendants argued that the legislature, seeing it as no change from former 
law, must have intended the same notice process in the former statute, too. In response, 
the State contended that the 1998 rewriters mistakenly changed the notice process 
substantively, contrary to what the Utah Legislature intended. (R. 100-01, 291). 
As this Court has recognized, "[l]ater versions of a statute do not necessarily reveal 
the intent behind an earlier version." Visitor Info. Center v. Customer Serv. Div., 930 
P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997). This warning is particularly apt in the instant case, where 
the 1998 version of section 72-3-108 did not accurately reflect legislative intent. The 
State's position on this point was vindicated by the Utah Legislature's amendment of 
section 72-3-108(2) in 2000 Utah Laws, ch. 324, § 5, effective March 16,2000, to 
provide: 
(2) A county may not vacate a county road unless notice of the hearing is: 
(a) published in a newspaper...; or 
(b) posted...; and 
(c) mailed to . . . all owners of property abutting the county road. 
Utah Code Ann. §72-3-108(2) (Supp. 2000). See Addendum B. The 2000 Utah 
Legislature corrected the error in the earlier version of section 72-3-108(2) to once again 
require notice to be mailed to abutting landowners, whether notice is otherwise provided 
by publication or by posting. To the extent that the later enactment sheds any light on the 
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meaning of former section 27-12-102.4, the law in effect in 1993 when Tooele County 
adopted Ordinance 93-9, it supports the interpretation urged by the State in the trial court 
and here on appeal. 
This Court should hold that former section 27-12-102.4 required notice of the 
petition and hearing to be mailed to abutting property owners even if notice was 
otherwise provided through publication and that the trial court erred in concluding 
otherwise. 
II. SECTION 27-12-102.4 REQUIRED THE COUNTY TO MAIL 
NOTICE OF THE PETITION AND HEARING TO ALL ABUTTING 
LANDOWNERS, NOT JUST TO THOSE WHO PAY PROPERTY 
TAXES 
Even if the statute required mailed notice in addition to notice by publication, 
defendants successfully argued below, it required that notice be mailed only to abutting 
landowners who pay property taxes and, thus, have a mailing address on the rolls of the 
county assessor. (R. 347). 
Former section 27-12-102.4 states that notice is given 
by mailing such notice to all owners of record of land abutting the county 
road proposed to be vacated addressed to the mailing address appearing 
on the rolls of the county assessor of the county wherein said land is 
located [.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). Defendants provided the 
trial court with affidavits from Tooele County's Assessor and Recorder stating that the 
Tooele County's assessor rolls do not show the State as an owner of property on 
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Stansbury Island with a mailing address (R.l 13-14, included as Addendum F). However, 
the affiants offered no explanation for this omission in the rolls pertaining to the 
sovereign lands around Stansbury Island, which may result from mistakes or neglect of 
official duty. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-22 (1999 ) (county recorder to annually 
prepare ownership plats showing "record owners" on January 1 and transmit to assessor); 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-22 (1999 ) (ownership plats to show "record owners of each 
tract of land in the county"); Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-303 (1996) (assessor shall become 
fully acquainted with all property in his county); cf. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 
(repealed 1998) (requiring notice by mail "to all owners of record of land abutting the 
county road"). 
Instead, the county's lawyer explained the omission by tendering this interpretation 
of the statutory language emphasized above: "How do you get on the county assessor's 
rolls? You pay taxes. The State doesn't pay taxes. They don't show up on the rolls. 
That's what our Affidavit of the County Assessor said to the Court. That's why the State 
wasn't mailed notice." (R. 355 at 19). Counsel for the Bleazards concurred in this 
reading of section 27-12-102.4, adding that the State "didn't care" about being notified-it 
had no need for, or interest in, notice of a proposal to the county to vacate a county road 
because in the statutes the State had already delegated that power to the county. (R. 355 
at 20-22; see also R. 337; 355 at 32-33). Moreover, although the defendants' 
memorandum informed the trial court that "[b]y law the rolls of the county assessor are 
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intended to list private property owners who are legally obligated to pay the property 
taxes" (R. 284), they provided no legal authority for this proposition. Nonetheless, Judge 
Young gave the statute the construction defendants requested.6 
This Court have given the following counsel about the proper construction of a 
statute's plain language in cases such as the instant one: 
Where we are faced with two alternative readings, and we have no reliable 
sources that clearly fix the legislative purpose, we look to the consequences 
of those readings to determine the meaning to be given the statute. Our 
clear preference is the reading that reflects sound public policy, as we 
presume that must be what the legislature intended. 
Redd, 1999 UT 108, f 12. 
This Court should reject the trial court's implausible interpretation of section 27-
12-102.4 for several reasons. First, it violates a principle of statutory construction 
because it contradicts the purpose of the statute, particularly sections 27-12-102.1 through 
-102.4, which is to alert abutting landowners to a proposed road closure that will affect 
their property interests. See Burns, 2000 UT 56, f 25,4 P.3d at 799-800; see also Nelson, 
6Judge Young may have been misled by the cryptic affidavits and by counsels' 
expansive remarks into thinking that all property owned by the State of Utah in Tooele 
County is not listed as such on the assessor's rolls, which, therefore, do not show the 
State's mailing address. As printouts from the Tooele County Tax Assessor's 
computerized rolls show, see Addendum G, the State owns numerous properties there, 
and the fact of its ownership and its mailing addresses are listed for the properties. 
These readily ascertainable matters of public record should be, and can be, judicially 
noticed on appeal. See McGarry v. Thompson, 201 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1948) (Court 
takes judicial notice of fact shown by public record, the state engineer's, not introduced 
below); State Board of Lands Commr's v. Ririe, 190 P. 59, 60 (Utah 1920) (same, for 
public records kept by Auditor and State Lands Board); see also Utah R. Evid. 201. 
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905 P.2d at 875. It is the interest as property owners on a public road that the legislature 
clearly sought to protect in section 27-12-102.4 (and in the current law, section 72-3-108), 
with no differentiation made between different types of owners for notice purposes. As a 
landowner, the State is equally as affected as other landowners by any proposal to vacate 
the public roads its lands abut. The legislative disinterest concocted by the Bleazards' 
attorneys out of whole cloth ignores the distinction between the State's interest as the 
main operator of the state highway system and the State's interest as the sovereign owner 
of public lands held in trust for all Utahns. 
Second, if the legislature meant to exclude all non-taxpaying landowners from the 
notice requirements it could have easily done so by simply inserting the adjective 
"taxpaying" before the terms "owners of record" in section 27-12-102.4 (as well as in 
section 10-8-8.4, the notice provision currently applicable to a proposal to vacate a city 
street or alley). Since the legislature did not do so, it is reasonable to assume it intended, 
for notice purposes, to provide mailed notice to all abutting landowners, regardless of tax-
exempt status. 
Third, the trial court's construction of the statute appears to be based on an 
erroneous understanding of which landowners the law requires be shown on the rolls of 
the assessor. Despite counsel's representation, the State is aware of no law stating that 
the assessor's rolls only list the names and addresses of landowners who are also 
taxpayers. On the contrary, section 17-21-22 requires the county recorder to annually 
23 
prepare documents showing record owners of property and to pass it on to the assessor, 
who is mandated by section 59-2-303 to be fully acquainted with all property in his 
county, not just taxable property. Moreover, as the public records in Addendum G 
demonstrate, the Tooele County Assessor's rolls do list the State of Utah-despite its tax-
exempt status-as owner of record for numerous other properties in the county and do 
show its mailing addresses. 
Fourth, the construction adopted below leads to absurd results contrary to sound 
public policy, in violation of basic principles of statutory construction. See Redd, 1999 
UT 108, f 12; Clover, 808 P.2d at 1045 n.39. Under Utah law, the State's property is 
exempt from property taxes, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1103(1) (1996), as is land owned by 
many other governmental and nongovernmental entities or individuals. For example, 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101(2)(d) (Supp. 2000) exempts federally-exempted land and 
property of nonprofit entities devoted to public, religious or charitable purposes. It also 
exempts property owned by the state, school districts, public libraries, and all other 
political subdivisions of the State. Accord Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2; see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 53A-3-408 (2000) (exempting property of local school boards); id. § 53B-20-106 
(2000) (same for higher education institutions); id. §§ 59-2-1104, -1105 (Supp. 2000) 
(exempting up to $82,500 of property of disabled veterans and their survivors). 
Under the trial court's construction, the words "addressed to the mailing address 
appearing on the rolls of the county assessor" in former section 27-12-102.4 (and in 
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current section 10-8-8.4) is a substantive description limiting abutting landowners to + 
those who are also taxpayers. Only the delimited subclass of taxpaying/abutting 
landowners is entitled to written notice of a proposal to vacate a public road. Thus, State 
Street between 400 and 500 South in Salt Lake City, where tax-exempt governments own 
land under the Matheson Courthouse and the City-County Building, could be closed 
without any individual written notice to the State, the city, or the county. North Temple 
in Salt Lake City could be vacated without any notice to the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, and the eastern dead end of North Medical Drive in Salt Lake City 
could be cut off without notifying the Jewish Community Center at Fort Douglas, the 
Children's Center, the University of Utah, the Moran Eye Institute, University Hospital, 
or Primary Children's Hospital-all abutting landowners exempt from paying property 
taxes. This Court should reject a construction of the language in former section 27-12-1-
2.4 (and current section 10-8-8.4) that attributes such a peculiar motive to the legislature 
and leads to such absurd results. 
Finally, the construction adopted by the trial should be rejected because it may 
render the statute unconstitutional. See In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, f 23; 
In re L.G.W., 641 P.2d at 131. To the extent abutting landowners' property interests will 
be affected by governmental abandonment of a public road, all of them-not just the ones 
who also must pay property taxes on their land-are entitled under the due process clause 
to adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. See Dairy Product Servs., 2000 UT 81, 
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K 48; Anderson, 589 P.2d at 1216; Tolman, 437 P.2d at 448.7 
This Court should hold that former section 27-12-102.4, correctly construed, 
required notice to be mailed "to all owners of record of land abutting the county road 
proposed to be vacated," regardless of whether the owner is property tax exempt. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah asks the Court to reverse the summary 
judgment awarded defendants and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 2*J£ day of November, 2000. 
ANNINA M. MITCHELL (#2274) 
Deputy Utah Solicitor General 
STEPHEN G. BOYDEN (#0410) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
7The State of Utah is entitled, as an abutting landowner, to whatever statutory due 
process was given by section 27-12-102.4 to all other abutting landowners. See United 
States v. Cardinal Mine Supply, Inc., 916 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th Cir. 1990); In re Vaughn, 
151 B.R. 87 (Texas 1993); see also City of Albuquerque v. Chavez, 941 P.2d 509, 513 
(N.M. App. 1997). 
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Addendum A 
George S. Young (#3589) 
Brent A. Bohman (#4275) 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & BACHTELL 
1850 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-8446 
Facsimile: (801)531-8468 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through the ) 
DIVISION OF FORESTRY, FIRE & ) 
STATE LANDS, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) ORDER GRANTING 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
v. ) 
TOOELE COUNTY, Utah, SDC MILE ) 
RANCH COMPANY, a Utah corporation, ) 
CRAIG S. BLEAZARD, an individual, ) 
MARK C. BLEAZARD, an individual, ) Case No.: 990300437 
JOHN D. BLEAZARD, an individual, and ) 
the AMERICAN OH- COMPANY, a ) Judge David S. Young 
Maryland corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
The State of Utah's, by and through the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
(the "Division"), Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants Six Mile Ranch 
Company, Mark Bleazard, Craig Bleazard and John BleazardY Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment having been heard by the court on April 12, 2000, Brent A. Bohman and George 
S. Young of Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell having appeared on behalf of the above referenced 
Defendants, Douglas Ahlstrom having appeared on behalf of Defendant Tooele County and 
Stephen Boyden having appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff State of Utah, the court having 
reviewed the pertinent pleadings of record and having heard the arguments of counsel, 
hereby concludes, orders and decrees as follows: 
1. With regard to the Division's claim that the Ordinance vacating the subject 
road is invalid because Tooele County failed to provide written notice to the 
abutting landowners, the court concludes as a matter of law that: 
a. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 did not require that written notice be 
provided to the abutting landowners when notice by publication has 
been made and, in any event, the Division was not a party to whom 
such written notice would have been required to be provided because 
it was not an abutting property owner on the rolls of the Tooele 
County Assessor as specified therein; 
b. Furthermore, the Division lacks standing to assert the lack of any 
such written notice to the abutting landowners entitled to such notice; 
and 
c. In any event, even assuming the Division had such standing, all of 
those abutting landowners not only had actual notice of and the 
opportunity to be heard on the merits of the Petition to Vacate but, in 
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fact, were either heard on the merits and/or waived any right to be 
heard. 
2. With regard to the Division's claim that the Ordinance vacating the subject 
road is invalid because it was not in the public interest to do so, the court 
finds that the State of Utah delegated to the Tooele County Commission the 
exclusive legislative authority to determine whether or not it was in the 
public interest to vacate the road, and there being no evidence presented that 
said determination constituted a manifest abuse of discretion or was the result 
of fraud, said claim therefore constitutes an impermissible collateral on the 
legislative discretion of Tooele County. 
3. With regard to the Division's claim that the Ordinance vacating the subject 
road is invalid because it violates the Public Trust Doctrine, the court finds 
that said doctrine is inapplicable to an ordinance vacating a road that is 
located on private property and, in any event, the Public Trust Doctrine does 
not vitiate a governmental authority to vacate a public road when it has been 
determined that it is in the public interest to do so. 
4. With regard to the Division's final claim that the Ordinance vacating the 
subject road merely caused said road to revert to the State of Utah, the court 
finds that Tooele County had the legal authority to vacate whatever public 
interest may have existed in die road, if any, regardless as to whether the 
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road was a public road by "dedication" or an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, but, in 
any event, there being no genuine issues of material fact, the court finds as a 
matter of law that the subject road was not an R.S. 2477 right-of-way. 
Based on the foregoing conclusions of law, the Division's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is hereby denied and Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is 
hereby granted. In addition, because each of Defendants' counterclaims are dependent on 
the Division having been able to set aside the Ordinance and thereby reach the merits of its 
quiet title claim, said counterclaims are hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
Tooele County 
Stephen G. Boyden / 
Asst. Attorney General 
Addendum B 
HIGHWAY CODE 27-12-102.1 
27-12-101. Title to property acquired by state. 
(1) Title to real property acquired by the department or the counties, cities, 
^d towns by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or other-
wise for highway rights-of-way or other highway purposes may be in fee 
simple or any lesser estate or interest. 
(2) A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right-of-way for which the 
public has only an easement passes the title of the person whose estate is 
transferred to the middle of the highway. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, } 101; 1901, ch. road commission" in Subsection (1); deleted 
j$7, § 29. "public" before "highway" near the beginning 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- of Subjection (2); and made changes in punctu-
^eiit, effective April 29, 1991, subdivided the ation and phraseology, 
jection; substituted "department1' for "state 
27-12-10& Abandonment of easement or vacation of high-
way. 
(1) (a) The commission shall abandon any easement or vacate any highway 
by resolution. 
(b) A certified copy of the resolution may be recorded without acknowl-
edgment, certification of acknowledgment, or further proof in the office of 
the county recorder of each county in which any portion of the easement 
to be abandoned or the highway to be vacated lies. 
(c) A fee may not be charged for recordation. On recordation, the aban-
donment or vacation is complete. 
(2) (a) When a highway for which the state holds only an easement is 
vacated or abandoned or when any other easement is abandoned, the land 
previously subject to the easement is free from the public easement for 
highway purposes. 
(b) If the state owns in foe the land in which the vacated highway was 
located, the department may sell, exchange, or otherwise dispose of the 
land in the manner provided by law. 
(3) In any proceeding for the abandonment or vacation of any state high-
way or part of a state highway, the department may reserve any easements, 
rights, or interests in the highway found desirable and in the best interest of 
the state. 
History* L» I N * c k 3$\ I 10* 1901, eh. section; substituted "departmsnt^ for "ammia-
1ST, I m sum* in Subsections (2Kb) and (3); and mads 
AasssMtaMMst Nets* — Hie 1901 amsosV changes in punctuation and phraseology, 
meat, sfltctoe April 2t\ 1901, subdivides] the 
27-12-102.1. Vacation, narrowing or change of name of 
county road — Petition by property owner. 
On petition by a person owning property within the county praying that a 
county road abutting such piuperty be vacated, narrowed, or the name thereof 
changed, the county legislative body of such county, upon hearing and upon 
being satisfied that there is good cause for such change of name, vacation or 
narrowing, that it will not be detrimental to the general interest, and that it 
should be made, may declare by ordinance such county road vacated, nar-
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rowed or the name thereof changed. The county legislative body may
 ln . 
in one ordinance the change of name, or the vacation, or the narrow^ ^ 
more than one county road. f^ 
History: C. 1953, 27-12-102.1, enacted by "county legislative body" for "board of 
L. 1965, ch. 52, § 1; 1993, ch. 227, § 302. commissioners" or for "county commit 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- throughout. 0,»* 
ment , effective May 3, 1993, subst i tuted 
27-12-102.2. Vacation, narrowing or change of name
 of 
county road — Action by county legislative bo<}v 
without petition. 
When there are two or more county roads of the same name in the countv 
the county legislative body by ordinance and without petition thereof, mL 
change the name of any such county road, so as to leave only one to L 
designated by the original name. When in the opinion of the county legislative 
body of the county there is good cause for vacating, or narrowing a county 
road, or any part thereof, and that such vacation or narrowing will not 1^  
detrimental to the general interest, it may, by ordinance, and without petition 
therefor, vacate or narrow such county road or any part thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 27-12-102.2, enacted by ment, effective May 3, 1993, substitute 
L. 1985, ch. 52, } 2; 1993, ch. 227, S 303. "county legislative body" for "board of county 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- commissioners" throughout. 
27-12-102.3. Vacation — Notice — Exception. 
Notice of the intention of the county legislative body to vacate any county 
road, or part thereof, shall in all cases be given as provided in Section 
27-12-102.4, except when there is filed with the county legislative body writ-
ten consent to such vacation by the owners of the property abutting the part of 
the county road proposed to be vacated, in which case such notice shall not be 
required. 
History: C. 1953, 27-12-UHLS, enacted by "Section 27-12-102.4" for "the next section' 
L. 1965, ch. 52, f 3; 1992, ch. 30, t 59; 1993, The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993 
ch. 227, § 304. twice substituted "county legislative body" for 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- "board of county commissioners." 
ment, effective April 27, 1992, substituted 
27-12-102.4. Vacation — Publication and posting or mail-
ing of notice. 
No county road shall be so vacated, unless notice of the pendency of the 
petition and prayer thereof, and the date of the hearing thereon, if such peti-
tion is filed, or of the intention of the county legislative body of the county to 
vacate, and the date of the hearing on such question if no petition is filed, be 
given by publishing in a newspaper published or of general circulation in such 
county once a week for four consecutive weeks preceding action on such peti-
tion or intention, or, where no newspaper is published in the county by post-
ing the notice in three public places therein for four consecutive weeks preced-
ing such petition, and by mailing such notice to all owners of record of land 
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putting the county road proposed to be vacated addressed to the mailing 
presses appearing on the rolls of the county assessor of the county wherein 
' d land is located. Action thereon shall take place within three months after 
he completion of notice. 
history: C. 1953, 27-12-102.4, enacted by ment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted 
, 1965, ch. 52, § 4; 1993, ch. 227, § 305. "county legislative body" for "board of county 
^^ynendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- commissioners" near the beginning. 
27-12-102.5. Vacation or narrowing of county road — Ef-
fect of action of county legislative body. 
The action of the county legislative body vacating or narrowing a county 
^ad which has been dedicated to public use by the proprietor, shall operate to 
^e extent to which it is vacated or narrowed, upon the effective date of the 
vacating ordinance, as a revocation of the acceptance thereof, and the relin-
quishment of the county's fees therein by the county legislative body, but the 
fight of way and easements therein, if any, of the property owner and the 
franchise rights of any public utility shall not be impaired thereby. 
History: C. 1953, 27-12-102.5, enacted by ment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted 
I. 1965, ch. 52, § 5; 1993, ch. 227, I 306. "county legislative body" for "board of county 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend* commissioners" in two places. 
27-12-103. Acquisition of property devoted to or held for 
other public use. 
(1) If property devoted to or held for some other public use for which the 
power of eminent domain might be exercised is to be taken for state highway 
purposes, the department may, with the consent of the person or agency in 
charge of the other public use, condemn real property to be exchanged with 
the person or agency for the real property to be taken for state highway 
purposes. 
(2) This section does not limit the department's authorization to acquire, 
other than by condemnation, property for exchange purposes. 
History: L. 1903, ch. 39, § 103; 1991, ch. sion" in Subsection (1); substituted "depart-
137, $ 31. ment's authorization0 for "authorization to the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- commission" in Subsection (2); and made 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, subdivided the changes in phraseology, 
section; substituted "department" for "commis-
27-12-103.2. Purpose statement 
The Legislature recognizes that highways provide tangible benefits to pri-
vate and public lands of the state by providing access, allowing development, 
and facilitating production of income. Many of those highways traverse state 
lands, including lands held by the state in trust for the school children and 
public institutions of the state. Many of the existing highways have been 
previously established without an official grant of an easement or right of 
entry from this state, yet these highways often are the only access to private 
and public lands of the state. The Legislature intends to establish a means for 
ensuring continued access to the private and public lands of the state for the 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Notice* impart constructive notice of their contents. 
Class D road maps on file with the a county First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 
ierk's office pursuant to this section did not P.2d 834 (Utah 1998). 
72-3-108. County roads — Vacation and narrowing. 
(1) A county may, by ordinance, vacate, narrow, or change the name of a 
county road without petition or after petition by a property owner. 
(2) A county may not vacate a county road unless notice of the hearing is: 
(a) published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county once a 
week for four consecutive weeks prior to the hearing; or 
(b) posted in three public places for four consecutive weeks prior to the 
hearing and is mailed to all owners of property abutting the county road. 
(3) The right-of-way and easements, if any, of a property owner and the 
franchise rights of any public utility may not be impaired by vacating or 
narrowing a county road. 
History: C. 1953, 72-3-108, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 270, § 
1998, ch. 270, § 77. 355 makes the act effective on March 21, 1998. 
72-3-109. Division of responsibility with respect to state 
highways in cities and towns. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), the jurisdiction and responsibility 
of the department and the municipalities for state highways within munici-
palities is as follows: 
(a) The department has jurisdiction over and is responsible for the 
construction and maintenance of: 
(i) the portion of the state highway located between the back of the 
curb on either side of the state highway; or 
(ii) if there is no curb, the traveled way, its contiguous shoulders, 
and appurtenances. 
(b) The department may widen or improve state highways within 
municipalities. 
(c) (i) A municipality has jurisdiction over all other portions of the 
right-of-way and is responsible for construction and maintenance of 
the right-of-way. 
(ii) If a municipality grants permission for the installation of any 
pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer, ditch, culvert, billboard, advertising 
sign, or any other structure or object of any kind or character within 
the portion of the right-of-way under its jurisdiction: 
(A) the permission shall contain the condition that any instal-
lation will be removed from the right-of-way at the request of the 
municipality; and 
(B) the municipality shall cause any installation to be removed 
at the request of the department when the department finds the 
removal necessary: 
(I) to eliminate a hazard to traffic safety; 
(ID for the construction and maintenance of the state 
highway; or 
(III) to meet the requirements of federal regulations. 
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History: C. 1953, 27-15-3, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 9, 9 3; 1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 1; 
renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270, § 74; 2000, 
ch. 324, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 
27-15-3, divided the section, designating the 
subsections, and added Subsections (1) and (2); 
substituted "class D roads* for 'roads" and made 
similar and related changes throughout the 
section, and made numerous stylistic changes 
throughout the section. 
The 2000 amendment, effective March 16, 
2000, in Subsection (1) substituted "has been* 
for "is" and deleted "reasonably passable" be-
fore "for usage", added Subsections (3) and (4), 
redesignating subsections accordingly; deleted 
the former last sentence in Subsection (5), 
which read: "A county shall be given a mini-
mum of two years to complete mapping of the 
class D roads within its boundaries", and made 
stylistic changes. 
72-3-106. Actions to determine priority of use of public 
roads. 
(1) The county attorney under the direction of the county legislative body 
shall determine a priority of public use of all county roads. 
(2) This action may be instigated by the written request often taxpayers of 
the county to the county legislative body. 
(3) The county legislative body shall request the county attorney to instigate 
action within a reasonable length of time. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 24; 1998, ch. 
227, * 296, 27-12-24; renumbered by L. 
1996, ch. 270, § 75. 
Amendment Notes* — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered 
this section^ which formerly appeared aa § 27-
12-24; designated the formerly undesignated 
subsections; in Subsection (1), substituted "use 
of all county roads" for "use of all highways, 
roads, streets, paths and ways not otherwise 
designated as a federal highway, state highway, 
county road, city street, or special highway* 
and made stylistic changes; and in Subsection 
(2), made a stylistic change and deleted "in the 
county in which the undesignated way is situ-
ated" at the end. 
72-3-107. County executive to keep plats of roads and 
highways. 
(1) The county executive of each county shall determine all county roads 
existing in the county and prepare and keep current plats and specific 
descriptions of the county roads. 
(2) The plats and specific descriptions shall be kept on file in the office of the 
county clerk or recorder. 
History: L. 1968, ch. 36, § 26; 1988, ch. 
227, 5 300, 27.12-2* renumbered by L. 
1996, ch. 270, | 76. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective March 21, 1996, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as $ 27-
12-26; designated the formerly undesignated 
subsections; in Subsection (1) substituted 
"county roads" for "same and of such other 
highways as he may from time to time locate 
upon public lands, which" at the end, and made 
stylistic changes; and m Subsection (2) added 
"The plats and specific descriptions'' at the 
beginning. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Note* 
Class D road maps on file with the a county 
clerk's office pursuant to this section did not 
impart constructive notice of their contents. 
First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 
P.2d 834 (Utah 1998). 
72-3-108. County roads — Vacation and narrowing. 
(1) A county may, by ordinance, vacate, narrow, or change the name of a 
county road without petition or after petition by a property owner. 
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(2) A county may not vacate a county road unless notice of the hearing is: 
(a) published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county once a 
week for four consecutive weeks prior to the hearing; or 
(b) posted in three public places for four consecutive weeks prior to the 
hearing; and 
(c) mailed to the department and all owners of property abutting the 
county road. 
(3) The right-of-way and easements, if any, of a property owner and the 
franchise rights of any public utility may not be impaired by vacating or 
narrowing a county road. 
(4) Except as provided in Section 72-5-305, if a county vacates a county road, 
the state's right-of-way interest in the county road is also vacated. 
History: C. 1953, 72-3-108, enacted by L. department and" in Subsection (2)(c), added 
1998, ch. 270, § 77; 2000, ch. 324, § 5. Subsection (4), and made a stylistic change. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 270, § 
ment, effective March 16, 2000, added Mthe 355 makes the act effective on March 21, 1998. 
72-3-109. Division of responsibility with respect to state 
highways in cities and towns. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), the jurisdiction and responsibility 
of the department and the municipalities for state highways within munici-
palities is as follows: 
(a) The department has jurisdiction over and is responsible for the 
construction and maintenance of: 
(i) the portion of the state highway located between the back of the 
curb on either side of the state highway, or 
(ii) if there is no curb, the traveled way, its contiguous shoulders, 
and appurtenances. 
(b) The department may widen or improve state highways within 
municipalities. 
(c) (i) A municipality has jurisdiction over all other portions of the 
right-of-way and is responsible for construction and maintenance of 
the right-of-way. 
(ii) If a municipality grants permission for the installation of any 
pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer, ditch, culvert, billboard, advertising 
sign, or any other structure or object of any kind or character within 
the portion of the right-of-way under its jurisdiction: 
(A) the permission shall contain the condition that any instal-
lation will be removed from the right-of-way at the request of the 
municipality; and 
(B) the municipality shall cause any installation to be removed 
at the request of the department when the department finds the 
removal necessary: 
(I) to eliminate a hazard to traffic safety; 
(II) for the construction and maintenance of the state 
highway, or 
(III) to meet the requirements of federal regulations. 
(d) If it is necessary that a utility, as defined in Section 72-6-116, be 
relocated, reimbursement shall be made for the relocation as provided for 
in Section 72-6-116. 
(e) (i) The department shall construct curbs, gutters, and sidewalks on 
the state highways if necessary for the proper control of traffic, 
driveway entrances, or drainage. 
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1 existing law to provide the State with written notice because 
2 publication was the notice that was provided under the law and 
3 that was sufficient 
4 I also find with die final comment of Mr. Ahlstrom, that 
5 the State was informed of die circumstances giving rise to die 
6 abandonment of die road as sought by die County. 
7 The Court finds further that die State cannot claim a 
8 public interest in opposition to that represented by the 
9 County. The County represented die public interest, and that 
10 has been the legislative scheme in respect to roads of this 
11 nature for some time. 
12 I don't find that there's any evidence of abuse of 
13 discretion, of fraud. I don't find diat diere's any basis for 
14 die Court to conclude diet die reversion dieory to die State 
15 would apply once die County had abandoned its interest 
16 This was a road on private land and private property. All 
17 of die private property owners were consistent in dietr desires 
18 and in dieir requests of u » County d i a t u ^ be provided to 
19 as a private road. 
20 Mr. Bohman, m ask you to prepare an order consistent 
21 Let me ask, is d m anything - your motion for summary 
22 judgment I have commented on already. Is there anything that 
23 I've overlooked in ruling on? 
24 MR. BOHMAN: t don't drink so, Your Honor. A s l 
25 understand your ruling, diere's nothing left in the case. I 
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require the State to turn around and condemn it for public use. 
THE COURT: it would seem to me that that last comment 
that you make would be rendered suspect by the fact that if the 
original road, indeed, existed there early on, that that road 
was abandoned in 1949. 
MR. BOHMAN: rt is not abandoned. 
THE COURT: it is still used today; is it? 
MR. BOYDEN: well, you can't abandon an RS2477 road. 
THE COURT: well - okay, legally you can't abandon i t 
It is certainly not used. 
MR. BOYDEN: t t h a s t o - i t b a s t o b e abandoned - well, 
why would you want to use it when d w e is a road -
THE COURT, YOU got a better road. 
MR. BOYDEN: Yeah, exactly. 
THE COURT: Yeah, my head is not painted on. 
O k a y -
MR. AHLSTROM: YOUT HOOOT? 
THE COURT: YCS. 
MR. AHLSTROM: May I offer one additional fact that I've 
just discovered during due hearing? 
THE COURT. Yea, Mr. Ahlstrom. 
MR. AHLSTROM: i dunk it has bearing on the colloquy diet 
you just had with Mr. Boyden. You asked earlier whether the 
State had any knowledge or -
THE COURT: I d id 
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MR. BOHMAN: - so on and so forth. The newspaper artick 
of June 17th, 1993, reporting on public' hearing stater 
"State Representative Jim Oowans 
(phonetic), in attendance said ha 
receives more calls on private-property 
issues than anytiring dee. His 
presentation wbgbedheeviry in favor of 
landowner rights." 
If lmayoffa .wedkihaveaStatBRqpreacntat ive 
official here at die hearing, and he did speak in favor of ' 
abandoning diat road. 
THE COURT: okay. Wcfl, diat comes as a big surprise to 
Mr. Boyden, I'm sure. 
MR. BOYDEN: itdoes. Thank yon. 
THE COURT. All right WeB, die Court finds that the 
State's motion for summary judgment should be and dio same is 
denied. 
The Court finds diat there was no duty to inform the Stile 
as an abutting landowner diat they were not, indeed an abutting 
landowner, and that diey were not on the rolls of the County 
Assessor as required by die statute for giving of diat notice; 
The Court finds that diere is a question of fact as to 
vhedier the road even went to die meander line at that time and 
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mean, dare may be (Inaudible) routes of getting to die same 
point I mean, obviously, the road didn't revert if it was 
RS2477, for instance, but -
THE COURT: ub-huh. Well, Pm going to allow you to 
prepare die order consistent bodi with die ruling that I have 
rendered from die bench and also widi your pleadings on dns 
matter if they're da? matters diat need to be dealt witft 
Mr. Boyden, do you have a further question? 
MR. BOYDEN: YDS. The State Representative was, in fact, 
a representative from the legislature. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. BOYDEN: And d m he did - not necessarily die person 
who would be responsible for decision making on the part of the 
State. 
THE COURT: YOUkDOW, I recognize there are significant 
concern* (bat you have, Mr. Boyden, in rctpect to notice. And 
I do know that a written teller to the State win have a better 
chuce or a written notice to the State will hive a better 
chance of landing on the right desk. I have a very peculiar 
situation in Salt Lake County right now with the Attorney 
General's Office claiming that they did not get notice because 
h was mailed to the sixth floor of the Court building - of 
the A.O.'s Office instead of to the fifth floor of the A.G.'s 
mac] 
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but he didn't appear. And I don't know what's happening in 
respect to those circumstances, but I've represented die State, 
I've spent many yean as an Assistant Attorney General and I 
sympathize with some of die confusion that occurs in 
representing various interests of this nature. So I am not 
finding fault, and I am certainly not finding fault with you. 
Your presentation here and your research has been thorough and 
complete. 
I will tell you that from my perspective at timet I get 
frustrated with die attention that I get from die State, and 
that' $ just simply a circumstance that happens to exist 
That's not something for which the State should be penalized. 
It's just something that happens. 
All right If you'll prepare the order consistent, 
Mr. Bohman? 
MR BOHMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The court's in recess, 
(Hearing adjourned.) 
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AN ORDINANCE VACATING A PORTION OF A TOOELE COUNTY ROAD 
ALONG THE WEST SIDE OF STANSBURY ISLAND. TOOELE, COUNTY, 
UTAH 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH ORDAINS 
AS FOLLOWS: 
SECTION 1 - PURPOSE. It is the purpose of this Ordinance to vacate and abandon a 
portion of a County Road running along the West side of Stansbury Island in Tooele County, 
Utah. This Ordinance is adopted pursuant to a petition of certain property owners on 
Stansbury Island, which property abuts the County Road. The County Commission finds 
that there is good cause for this County road vacation and that it will not be detrimental to 
the general interest. 
SECTION il - VACATION OF COUNTY ROAD. That portion of the Tooele County Road 
situated on the West side of Stansbury Island in Tooele County, Utah, and described as 
follows, is hereby formally vacated, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 27-12-102.1 
through 27-12-102.5, U.C.A. 1953. as amended. 
Commencing at the South line of Section 16, Township 1 North, Range 6 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and continuing North through Sections 1 6 , 9 , 4 and 
5 of said Township and Range; and thence running through Sections 32, 29, 20, 
21,16 and 9 of Township 2 North, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
Since this ordinance has no broad application to the residents of Tooele County and is 
of a private nature, it shall not be included in the Tooele County Code. 
00033 
SECTION Ml - EFFECTIVE DATE. Tnis o-cir.snce s.is'I :e».e e'les: f r r -cn csv< aftc ; 
publication in one issue of a newspaper published in and having general circulation in Tooe'e 
County, Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Board of County Commissioners of Tooele County have 
r 7 ( L 
passed, approved and enacted this Ordinance this 2<th day of August, 1993. 
BOARD OP COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
LELAND J/JJOGAN, Chairman 
.^CTr^aiwp/ftf'HbQan voted K/P*? 
)}qrr^fs$oftV Hunsaker votedT At4y 
feomVniWioner Griffith voted \/4A 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RONALD L. ELTON 
Tooele County Attorney 
2 
r.,". A Q ~> 
Addendum F 
EXHIBIT 1 
AFFIDAVIT OF CALLEEN PESHELL, TOOELE COUNTY RECORDER 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF TOOELE ) 
Calleen Peshell, being first duly sworn, hereby states under oath as follows: 
1. I am the duly elected recorder of Tooele County. 
2. My office has the responsibility of recording all deeds to real property and 
preparing plat maps based thereon. 
3. I have reviewed the records in my office, which indicate that in 1993 the 
State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands was not an owner 
of property abutting the West Stansbury Island road proposed for vacation. 
4. In 1993, the only owners of land abutting the road in question were the Six 
Mile Ranch Co. (LaVon Bleazard, owner), Craig S. Bleazard, Mark C. 
Bleazard, John D. Bleazard, Rhea E. Castagno, Reese Richman, Robert 
Cook, United States of America (BLM), and Magnesium Corporation of 
America. 
DATED this <$l day of September, 1999. 
(ani/i64^4^9^ Lit/ 
Calleen Peshell, Tooele County Recorder 
Subscribed and sworn before me this /y] day ofS^)tember, 1999, by Calleen 
Peshell. 
EXHIBIT 2 
AFFIDAVIT OF JERRIE PAYSTRUP, TOOELE COUNTY ASSESSOR 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
!SS. 
COUNTY OF TOOELE ) 
Jerrie Paystrup, being first duly sworn, hereby states under oath as follows: 
1. I am the duly elected assessor of Tooele County. 
2. My office has the responsibility of maintaining the tax assessment rolls 
pertaining to all real property in Tooele County. 
3. I have reviewed the records and rolls in my office, which indicate that in 1993 
the State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands was not listed as 
a property owner on Stansbuiy Island, neither did it have a mailing address on 
the rolls of the county assessor. 
DATED this jU^day of September, 1999. 
o 
Jerae^Paystrup, e Cdunty Assess* Tooel essor 
Subscribed and sworn before me this^S^day of September, 1999, by Jerrie 
Paystrup. 
—•J^ J"" ~ — Notary Public I 
/ * ^ * * \ A OEBOBAHC.SAGERS , 
A f^zF**\ ** 4 7 So jth Ma»n • 
*j Tooee Utah 84074 . 
7 f/y Cu^miss'on E<P«'e* I 
May 14 2002 State^ ofjJtah
 —
 J 
Addendum G 
Ll/01/2000 12:21:07 
PARCEL ## 
01-268-0-0002 
02-013-0-0011 
02-138-0-0004 
02-138-0-0005 
03-087-0-0001 
04-087-0-0001 
04-087-0-0002 
04-087-0-0005 
04-087-0-0006 
04-101-C-0016 
04-101-L-0001 
05-100-0-0001 
06-011-0-0002 
06-058-0-0004 
06-079-D-0002 
06-079-D-0016 
06-079-D-0032 
06-079-G-0002 
06-079-G-0016 
06-079-G-0032 
06-079-G-0036 
06-135-0-0001 
06-136-0-0001 
ESC quits, 
NAME PROP ADDRESS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
* & t moves bar, PgDn, PgUp gets more data, «-
CITY 
<Enter> selects 
1/01/2000 12:21:34 
PARCEL ## 
07-089-0-0002 STATE 
07-095-0-0002 STATE 
04-026-G-0001 STATE 
04-101-D-0001 STATE 
04-101-K-0002 STATE 
06-125-0-0002 STATE 
06-125-0-0004 STATE 
06-126-0-0002 STATE 
06-126-0-0003 STATE 
01-002-0-0012 STATE 
01-002-0-0013 STATE 
01-002-0-0014 STATE 
01-003-0-0008 STATE 
01-003-0-0009 STATE 
01-003-0-0010 STATE 
01-003-0-0011 STATE 
01-003-0-0012 STATE 
01-003-0-0016 STATE 
01-003-0-0028 STATE 
01-003-0-0036 STATE 
01-003-0-0037 STATE 
01-004-0-0003 STATE 
01-004-n-nnne; CTJVTC 
NAME 
OF UTAH 
OF UTAH 
OP UTAH 
OF UTAH 
OF UTAH DIV OP FACI 
OP UTAH WILDLIFE RE 
OP UTAH WILDLIFE RE 
OP UTAH WILDLIFE RE 
OP UTAH WILDLIFE RE 
ROAD COMMISSION 
ROAD COMMISSION 
ROAD COMMISSION 
ROAD COMMISSION 
ROAD COMMISSION 
ROAD COMMISSION 
ROAD COMMISSION 
ROAD COMMISSION 
ROAD COMMISSION 
ROAD COMMISSION 
ROAD COMMISSION 
ROAD COMMISSION 
ROAD COMMISSION 
Dr»an mMUTeeTMT 
PROP ADDRESS CITY 
11/01/2000 12:22:05 
PARCEL ## NAME PROP ADDRESS CITY 
01-004-0-0008 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
01-004-0-0010 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
01-004-0-0012 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
01-005-0-0006 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
01-005-0-0008 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
01-006-0-0002 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
01-006-0-0004 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
01-141-0-0001 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
01-141-0-0004 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
01-141-0-0009 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
01-263-0-0010 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
04-070-0-0032 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
04-074-0-0002 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
06-052-0-0011 STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
01-262-0-0002 STATELINE PROPERTIES INC 
01-262-0-0005 STATELINE PROPERTIES INC 
10-045-0-0025 STATHAM FRANK & BETTY TRU MARLETTE DR: 705 TOOELE 
10-024-0-0001 STATHAM SCOTT & PAULA 
08-055-0-0009 STEADMAN BRUCE T & LYNDA 
02-004-0-0021 STEADMAN BRUCE T & LYNDA 
08-017-0-0056 STEADMAN DAVID A & THERES N NELSON: 685 TOOELE 
12-026-0-0214 STEADMAN DAVID L E 0180 N: 592 TOOELE 
11-015-0-0138 STEADMAN GARY JT N 0830 E: 828 TOOELE 
ESC quits, * & t moves bar, PgDn, PgUp gets more data, •<—J <Enter> select 
11/01/2000 12:20:42 
PARCEL ## NAME PROP ADDRESS CITY 
01-252-0-0001 STATE LINE PROPERTIES INC 
01-258-0-0018 STATE LINE PROPERTIES INC 
01-266-0-0006 STATE LINE PROPERTIES INC 
01-266-0-0007 STATE LINE PROPERTIES INC 
01-267-0-0006 STATE LINE PROPERTIES INC 
01-269-0-0007 STATE LINE PROPERTIES INC 
01-266-0-0003 STATE LINE PROPERTIES LTD 
01-252-0-0002 STATE LINE PROPERTIES LTD 
01-252-0-0003 STATE LINE PROPERTIES LTD 
01-267-0-0003 STATE LINE PROPERTIES LTD 
01-267-0-0002 STATE LINE PROPERTIES LTD 
01-267-0-0007 STATE LINE PROPERTIES LTD 
01-267-0-0001 STATE LINE PROPERTIES LTD 
01-262-0-0003 STATE LINE PROPERTIES LTD 
01-266-0-0002 STATE LINE PROPERTIES LTD 
01-265-0-0003 STATE LINE PROPERTIES LTD 
01-269-0-0010 STATE LINE PROPERTIES LTD. 
04-087-0-0007 STATE OF UT DIV OF WILDLI 
04-087-0-0008 STATE OF UT DIV OF WILDLI 
04-087-0-0009 STATE OF UT DIV OF WILDLI 
11/01/2000 12:33:20 
T O O E L E C O U N T Y C O R P O R A T I O N 
TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE 
Parcel 01-268-0-0002 
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH 
Name 2 
Address 3 TRIAD CENTER 
SALT LAKE CITY 
District 003 WENDOVER 
Mortgage 
EX 2000 
UT 84101-
Last Yr Tax 
Tax Levied 
Special Tax 
Abatements 
Payments 
Amount Due 
Back Taxes 
0.00 | 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
No 
PROPERTY 
2000 
ACRES MARKET TAXABLE 
0.00 0 0 
1999 
MARKET TAXABLE 
0 0 
TOTALS 0.00 
M)odify +/- Degal S)earch B)a.ck Taxes ESC 
Tear Built : : Building Type :: Square Footage :0: 
[istory Description: 
Legal Description for 01-268-0-0002 
'ax Rate :0.012058: / / 
r 1/2 NB 1/4; SB 1/4 NW 1/4; NE 1/4 SW 1/4; S 1/2 SW 1/4; NW 1/4 SB 1/4; OF 
.ECTION 8, TIS, R19W, SLB&M. FROM BLM. 280.00 AC 
11/01/2000 12:27:20 
Year Built : : Building Type :: Square Footage :0: 
History Description: 
Legal Description for 02-013-0-0011 
Tax Rate :0.011959: / / 
BEG 880 FT, S & 103.12 RODS W OF NE CORNER, SEC 33 N 79 30« W 80 FT M/L SWL' 
225FT, M/L ALONG HIWAY R/W LINE, EASTERLY 53 FT M/L TO DITCH, TH NELY 14 
RODS 9.75 FT TO BEG 0.00 AC 
11/01/2000 12:31:13 
TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE 
Parcel 02-138-0-0004 EX 2000 
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH 
Name 2 
Address 355 NORTH TEMPLE STE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84108-
District 001 TOOELE 
Mortgage 
Last Yr Tax 
Tax Levied 
Special Tax 
Abatements 
Payments 
Amount Due 
Back Taxes 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
No 
PROPERTY 
2000 
ACRES MARKET TAXABLE 
0.00 0 0 
1999 
MARKET TAXABLE 
0 0 
TOTALS 0.00 
M)odify +/- Degal S)earch B)ack Taxes ESC 
fear Built : : Building Type :: Square Footage :0: 
listory Description: 
Legal Description for 02-138-0-0004 
Tax Rate :0.011959: / / 
JW1/4 OF SECTION 7 T3S R4W SLB&M (FIRST TIME IN COMPUTER FOR 1996) 160.29 AC 
11/01/2000 12:35:47 
T 0 0 E L E C O U H T Y C R A T I O N 
TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE 
Parcel 03-087-0-0001 EX 2000 
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH 
Name 2 
Address 3 TRIAD CENTER 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-
District 010 O.D. MOSQUITO 
Mortgage 
Last Yr Tax 
Tax Levied 
Special Tax 
Abatements 
Payments 
Amount Due 
Back Taxes 
0.00 1 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
No 
PROPERTY 
2000 
ACRES MARKET TAXABLE 
0.00 0 0 
1999 
MARKET TAXABLE 
0 0 
TOTALS 0.00 
M)odify +/- Degal S)earch B)ack Taxes ESC 
Year Built : : Building Type :: Square Footage :0: 
History Description: 
Legal Description for 03-087-0-0001 
Tax Rate :0.009684: / / 
640.00 AC 
11/01/2000 12:38:52 
T O O E L E C O U N T Y C O R P Q R A T I O N 
TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE 
Parcel 04-087-0-0001 EX 2000 
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH 
Name 2 
Address -
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-
District 010 O.D. MOSQUITO 
Mortgage 
Last Yr Tax 
Tax Levied 
Special Tax 
Abatements 
Payments 
Amount Due 
Back Taxes 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
No 
PROPERTY 
2000 
ACRES MARKET TAXABLE 
0.00 0 0 
1999 
MARKET TAXABLE 
0 0 
TOTALS 0.00 
M)odify +/- Degal S)earch B)ack Taxes ESC 
If ear Built : : Building Type :: Square Footage : 0; 
History Description: 
Legal Description for 04-087-0-0001 
rax Rate -.0.009684: / / 
W 1/2 OF SW 1/4, SEC 3, T1S,R7W, CONT 80 AC 80.00 AC 
11/01/2000 12:39:36 
T
.,0___0__E..L_E. C O D . N_ T J C O R P Oj.!f..LLQJ., 
TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE 
Parcel 04-101-C-0016 EX 2000 
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH 
Name 2 
Address 355 WEST NORTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84180-1204 
District 019 NO TOOELE CO FIRE DIST 
Mortgage 
Last Yr Tax 
Tax Levied 
Special Tax 
Abatements 
Payments 
Amount Due 
Back Taxes 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
No 
PROPERTY 
2000 
ACRES MARKET TAXABLE 
0.00 0 0 
1999 
MARKET TAXABLE 
0 0 
TOTALS 0.00 
M)odify +/- Degal S)earch B)ack Taxes ESC 
Year Built : : Building Type :: Square Footage :0: 
History Description: 
Legal Description for 04-101-C-0016 
Tax Rate :0.009386: / / 
THE E 1/2 OF E 1/2 OF SECTION 16 TIS R12W SLB&M NEW ACCOUNT FOR 1993 FROM BL 
1 1 / 0 1 / 2 0 0 0 1 2 : 4 2 : 1 1 
T O O E L E . C J ^ J ^ T J ^ ^ R A T I O N 
TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE 
1Parcel 06-011-0-0002EX 2000 
Name 1 STATE OP UTAH 
Name 2 
Address C/O STATE LAND BOARD 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-
District 019 NO TOOELE CO FIRE DIST 
Mortgage 
Last Yr Tax 
Tax Levied 
Special Tax 
Abatements 
Payments 
Amount Due 
Back Taxes 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
No 
PROPERTY 
2000 
ACRES MARKET TAXABLE 
0.00 0 0 
1999 
MARKET TAXABLE 
0 0 
TOTALS 0.00 
M)odify +/- Degal S)earch B)ack Taxes ESC 
5fear Built : : Building Type :: Square Footage :0: 
History Description: 
Legal Description for 06-011-0-0002 
Tax Rate :0.009386: / / 
NW 1/4 OP NW 1/4, S 1/2 OP NW 1/4, SW 1/4, SEC 15, T4S, R4W, SLM, CONT 280 
kC 280.00 AC 
11/01/2000 12:43:50 
Year Built : : Building Type :: Square Footage :0: 
History Description: 
Legal Description for 04-101-K-0002 
Tax Rate :0.009684: CSHAFF 06/16/1998 
BEG AT S 1/4 COR OF SECTION 16, TIS R15W SLB&M, TH N 88° 37»38" W 406.42 FT 
ALG SEC LI, TH N 1° 22'22" E 200 FT,, TH S 88° 37'38" E 406.42 FT, TH S 1° 
22'22" W 200.00 FT TO THE POB OUT OF 4-101-K-l 1.87 AC 
Ll /01 /2000 1 2 : 4 4 : 4 1 
T O O E L E C O U N T Y C O R P O R A T I O N 
TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE 
Parcel 06-125-0-0002 EX 2000 
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH WILDLIFE RESOUR 
Name 2 
Address 1596 NO TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116-
District 017 O.D. WATER CONSERVANCY 
Mortgage 
Last Yr Tax 
Tax Levied 
Special Tax 
Abatements 
Payments 
Amount Due 
Back Taxes 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
No 
PROPERTY 
2000 
ACRES MARKET TAXABLE 
0.00 0 0 
1999 
MARKET TAXABLE 
0 0 
TOTALS 0.00 
M)odify +/- Degal S)earch B)ack Taxes ESC 
ear Built : : Building Type :: Square Footage :0 
istory Description: 
Legal Description for 06-125-0-0002 
ax Rate :0.009056: / / 
1/2 OF SE 1/4, SEC 16, T7S, R5W, CONT 80 AC 80.00 AC 
11/01/2000 12:45:21 
T O O E L f^ywwuSnnn^nnn^nnn^nnnTn^wymnn^nnn^nn^nnn^nnn0 R A T I O N 
- TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE 
Parcel 06-126-0-0002 EX 2000 
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH WILDLIFE RESOUR 
Name 2 
Address 1596 NO TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116-
District 017 O.D. WATER CONSERVANCY 
Mortgage 
Last Yr Tax 
Tax Levied 
Special Tax 
Abatements 
Payments 
Amount Due 
Back Taxes 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
No 
PROPERTY 
2000 
ACRES MARKET TAXABLE 
0.00 0 0 
1999 
MARKET TAXABLE 
0 0 
TOTALS 0.00 
M)odify +/- L)egal S)earch B)ack Taxes ESC 
Year Built : : Building Type 
History Description: 
Square Footage :0 
Legal Description for 06-126-0-0002 
Tax Rate :0.009056: / / 
W 1/2 OF NW 1/4, OF SEC 28, T7S, R5W, LESS 2.60 AC TO ST RD COMM, CONT 77.40 
AC 77.40 AC 
